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Embodying the emotions also involves theoretically
situating them in the social body such that one can ex-
amine how emotional discourses are formed by the
shapes of the ecologies and political economies in
which they arise. (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990, p. 13;
italics added)
Sabini and Silver (this issue) present a model of
emotion language in which the link between emo-
tional experience and emotion word is determined
by the social context of communication. According
to their view, emotion words do not necessarily map
onto specific emotional experiences—on one hand,
the same experiential state can be described by dif-
ferent words, as in the case of embarrassment and
shame, but on the other hand, different experiential
states might be described by the same word, as in
the case of regret. Such a mismatch of emotion and
lexicon is hypothesized to exist because emotion
words are descriptions produced by an observer who
infers certain psychological characteristics of a per-
son, in a given context. Following appraisal theories
(e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman &
Smith, 2001; Scherer, 2001), Sabini and Silver pro-
pose that emotions are often the result of subjective
interpretation. However, Sabini and Silver’s model
goes beyond standard appraisal models because they
argue that the interpretation of the affective experi-
ence occurs relative to an (actual or implied) audi-
ence, and constitutes a communicative act. Emotion
terms thus implicitly convey the knowledge that
both speaker and audience bring to the communica-
tive table.
Because the manner in which experiential states
map onto lexical terms is constrained by the commu-
nicative context, Sabini and Silver’s (this issue)
model concerns the pragmatics of emotion language.
Such a pragmatic account is a novel proposal in the
social psychology of emotion terms; however, theo-
ries in both pragmatics (e.g., Sperber & Wilson,
1995), and cognitive linguistics (e.g., Gibbs,
Leggitt, & Turner, 2002; Gibbs & Van Orden, 2003;
Kövecses, 2000) have dealt with contextual aspects
of emotion language. Two consequences resulting
from those accounts are especially worth consider-
ing in the context of Sabini and Silver’s target arti-
cle: First, the pragmatic aspect of emotion language
that involves a communicative intention, and sec-
ond, how emotion language is embodied in the social
context.
Pragmatic Aspects of Emotion
Language: Communicative Intention
In recent years, one of the most influential models
of communication has been relevance theory (Sperber
& Wilson, 1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2003). Developed
out of Grice’s conversational theory (1957), this model
of communication proposes that comprehension re-
quires a common base of a cognitive environment that
is shared by speaker and audience. A cognitive envi-
ronment consists of the set of manifest facts that
speaker and audience are willing to entertain as true, or
at least as probably true. Such manifest facts are the re-
sult of either being directly perceived, or of being in-
ferred. Much of communication actually has to be in-
ferred: According to relevance theory, the speaker
demonstrates the intention to convey a certain thought,
and the audience needs to infer the communicative in-
tention from the provided evidence. The important
point, then, is that both speaker and audience entertain
a common reality, of which a lot of information is not
actually given, but has to be inferred. This view sharply
contrasts with standard models of communication that
assume that a “sender” packages, or encodes, a “mes-
sage,” which is then decoded by a “receiver” (e.g.,
Shannon & Weaver, 1949). According to Sperber and
Wilson (1995), it is not the coding or decoding of mes-
sage content that is involved in successful communica-
tion, but the making of inferences about the communi-
cative intention of the speaker. Communication thus
goes well beyond what is actually being said; however,
deriving these inferences requires effort on the part of
the audience.
The goal of communication is thus to accomplish
the greatest possible cognitive outcome while expend-
ing the smallest possible processing effort—namely, to
communicate only what is relevant. Relevance is de-
fined by the relationship of cognitive outcome relative
to processing effort. The greater the cognitive effect of
a communicative act, the greater the relevance of the
communication. Because all cognitive processing is
effortful, less processing effort is most desirable, and
thus, the smaller the processing effort, the greater the
relevance. Based on this notion, two communicative
principles follow (Sperber & Wilson, 1995): First,
communication aims at maximizing relevance; and
second, speakers presume that their communicative
acts are indeed relevant. In other words, people only
say what is necessary, and do not say too much, nor too
little. For example, if I was to tell you that you are right
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now reading a commentary, my statement would not
provide any new information to you, and thus, would
not be relevant. Indeed, people who cannot make the
elusive yet profound distinction between relevant and
irrelevant are considered (at best) socially inept, or (at
worst) autistic (Happé, 1993).
How is all this relevant to Sabini and Silver’s target
article? Consider the example of anger versus envy as
discussed: A person is feeling angry, and does not real-
ize that everybody around him interprets his feeling as
envy, rather than as righteous anger. In this case, the
speaker describing the event has information that is at
the moment unavailable to the person actually experi-
encing the emotion; this information, namely the
causal history on which the feeling of envy is based
(becoming aware of another person’s accomplishment)
can be brought to bear to describe a complex situation
to an audience—it is a relevant piece of communica-
tion. One emotion word—envy—can thus succinctly
describe, with minimum processing effort, a rather
complex state of affairs that consists of a person’s de-
sire to achieve a particular outcome, that person’s in-
ability to achieve that outcome, while witnessing an-
other person’s success at achieving that very outcome.
Similarly, consider Sabini and Silver’s example of
shame versus embarrassment. Shame is said to be the
emotion that one feels when one’s actual shortcoming
is revealed, whereas embarrassment is said to be the
emotion that one feels when one’s apparent shortcom-
ing is revealed. The main difference between those two
emotions lies in whether the existence of the shortcom-
ing is real or not. Regardless, however, as long as both
speaker and audience share, to use Sperber and Wil-
son’s (1995) terms, the same cognitive environment,
and hold manifest the same kinds of facts (whether true
or not), the communication of a given situation is suc-
cessful. Once again, a single word has the potential to
succinctly summarize a highly complex condition.
One need not say more.
According to relevance theory, one would expect
that communicating some emotions might be more im-
portant than others. Among the more critical ones
should be the ones that are most relevant to maintain-
ing social relationships. For example, detecting the vi-
olation of social contracts is considered especially crit-
ical from an evolutionary perspective (Cosmides,
1989; but see also Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), and emo-
tions associated with “cheater detection” should be es-
pecially relevant. Hupka, Lenton, and Hutchinson
(1999) report data that speaks to this issue. They inves-
tigated how emotion terms were added to the vocabu-
lary in 64 different language communities. Hupka and
colleagues’methodology was modeled after the classic
work by Berlin and Kay (1969), who looked at what
color terms were central to the vocabulary. Berlin and
Kay (1969) found that black and white were always
present if only two color terms existed in a language,
red was added if there was an additional term, and so
on. Hupka and colleagues (1999) analyzed languages
regarding their most basic emotion terms, and found
that all languages first developed expressions for anger
and guilt. In other words, anger and guilt are for emo-
tion terms what black and white are for color terms.
This sequence in development of the emotion terms
may have followed from the need to enforce certain
rules of social conduct: Social contracts need to be
obeyed; in the case of a transgression, anger indicates
that a social rule has been broken. Guilt, on the other
hand, indicates that the wrongdoer is acknowledging
the wrongdoing. In this way, certain emotions are cen-
tral for restoring social order. Thus, emotion talk has
the potential to enforce a moral order, for example, by
taking or denying responsibility for one’s actions, or by
assigning responsibility to others, and so on (see also,
Bamberg, 1997). Some emotions appear to be espe-
cially relevant in doing so.
In summary, Sabini and Silver’s (this issue) model
of emotion terms is consistent with the notion of com-
municative intention in relevance theory: Speaker and
audience share manifest assumptions, whether factu-
ally true or not. When speakers have additional knowl-
edge that they consider relevant (e.g., insights into
whether a person indeed consumes pornographic ma-
terial or not), these insights are communicated to the
audience in the most efficient way: A person is de-
scribed as either experiencing shame, or embarrass-
ment. Thus, one single word can contain all the under-
lying manifest assumptions of a given
speaker-audience relationship, and thus can accom-
plish maximal relevance. What happens, however,
when a single word is not enough, when experiences
are more nuanced than can be communicated using
standard emotion terms? These are the situations in
which emotion metaphors enter the picture (Fainsilber
& Ortony, 1987; Gibbs et al., 2002; Ortony, 1975).
Embodied Metaphors in Emotion
Language
People talk about feeling on top of the world, down
in the dumps, they might be getting hot under the col-
lar, or be shaking in their shoes. These figurative ex-
pressions describing emotional experiences are very
prevalent in everyday talk (Kövecses, 1990, 2000;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and can be processed effort-
lessly (for a review, see Gibbs, 1994). People are in fact
especially likely to use metaphors when describing
emotion, and use more metaphors for intense emotions
than for mild emotions (Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987).
Thus, metaphors are particularly useful in conveying
subtle nuances of emotional experience (Gibbs et al.,
2002). For example, Gibbs and colleagues (2002)
noted that figurative expressions such as I totally ex-
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ploded are understood differently than literal expres-
sions such as I was really angry. One reason why meta-
phors are so powerful in emotion language is because
they have the potential to evoke vivid accounts that tap
into actual physical experience, such as the experience
of emotion (Ortony, 1975). Figurative expressions of
specific emotions reflect aspects of the bodily experi-
ence of those emotions (Kövecses, 1990). Consider the
examples of anger and fear, two emotions that vary
greatly in their physical experience, as well as their
conceptual structure. When angry, for example, people
talk about letting off steam, losing their cool, being
ready to explode, and so on. For those expressions,
HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER is the source
domain of the metaphor for which various “entail-
ments” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) follow. For example,
when a container explodes, what is inside of it comes
out. Similarly, when a person cannot “contain” the
feeling any longer and explodes with anger, all the feel-
ings are set free (Kövecses, 1990, p. 55). Similar to an-
ger, the metonomies used to talk about fear correspond
to physiological and behavioral aspects of fear. FEAR
IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER, but in contrast to anger,
the fluid is not hot, but cold. Whereas anger is experi-
enced as hot, and is characterized by an increase in skin
temperature (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), this
is not the case for fear. Thus, common expressions re-
flect feeling cold, such as getting cold feet, or having a
cold sweat break out.
In addition to physical sensations, people also use
spatial terms to describe emotions. For instance, the
basic orientation of the human body in space (certain
things are up or down, relative to the body) is used
when metaphorically talking about feeling up or down.
These expressions are correlated with what goes on
with the human body when one feels a certain emotion:
An upright, relaxed posture when happy, versus a
slumped, drooping posture when depressed. Even
when the spatial location of a stimulus is incidental,
people appear to have an implicit understanding that
good things tend to be up, whereas bad things tend to
be down (Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schnall & Clore,
2004).
Could it be, however, that metaphors are specific
to certain languages and cultures? In fact, similar
metaphoric systems have been found across differ-
ent, unrelated languages (Emanatian, 1995; Yu,
1995). For instance, some evidence suggests that the
source domains that are used to describe anger, for
example, HEAT and FIRE, are universal across lan-
guages like Hungarian, Chinese, and Japanese
(Kövecses, 2000), suggesting that the shared nature
of physiological processes associated with emo-
tional experiences indeed results in shared concep-
tual structure. Thus, the figurative language involv-
ing emotions is not arbitrarily constructed, but
reflects the specific physiological and behavioral as-
pects of emotional experiences. Because metaphors
tap into those universal physical experiences of emo-
tion, they are especially relevant for communicating
feelings (Gibbs et al., 2002; Gibbs & Van Orden,
2003).
Studies of figurative language have been situated
in the more general framework of embodied cogni-
tion. Investigators of embodied cognition assume that
cognitive processes are influenced and constrained by
the way we function in the world with our bodies
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997; Glenberg, 1997;
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991). More recently, the value of an embod-
ied perspective has also been recognized in social
psychology (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, &
Ruppert, 2003; Schnall, 2004; Semin & Smith, 2002;
Smith & Semin, 2004). For example, the same as-
sumptions that underlie the idea of embodied cogni-
tion are also applicable to embodied affect (Schnall,
2004). Central to the embodied cognition position is
the assumption that cognition ultimately serves ac-
tion, and a similar assumption can be made about af-
fect and emotion, because affect provides information
about the liking or disliking of objects and situations,
and about the value of pursuing or avoiding particular
actions (Clore et al., 2001). Similarly, attitudes serve
not merely as mental structures of preference, but
also as a compass for action (Clore & Schnall, 2005).
A further assumption, which is especially important
with regard to Sabini and Silver’s target article, is that
cognitive and affective processes are constrained not
only by the social context, but also by the nature of
the human body. When it comes to communication,
embodied language, such as emotion metaphors, has
the potential to evoke emotional responses, more so
than literal language (Gibbs et al., 2002). Thus, em-
bodied metaphors make it possible to communicate
with a high degree of precision the various subtleties
of emotional experience, and thus, make communica-
tion optimally relevant.
In summary, as noted by Abu-Lughod and Lutz
(1990) in the introductory paragraph, emotion lan-
guage emerges from the complex interactions of cog-
nitive activity that is contextually constrained on mul-
tiple levels. Communication is constrained by the
social context, and the communicative intentions that
have to be inferred in a speaker-audience situation. In
addition, communication is also constrained by the
nature of the human body, because emotion can be
conveyed so well when using embodied metaphors.
At the end, one need not, as Sabini and Silver fear,
“trade ontological simplicity for theoretical complex-
ity,” because what looks from the outside like a com-
plicated set of rules is in fact evidence for how effi-
ciently the “leaky mind” (Clark, 1997) works when
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